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ABSTRACT 
The minority shareholder in a non-listed limited by share company 
 
The present work investigates the remedies the Italian law grants 
to the shareholder, who disagrees with the company’s organizational 
and management resolutions he did not support. 
The analysis focuses on the non-listed companies limited by 
shares, specifically with regard to the rights of control and information, 
the internal procedural guarantees, the legal remedies and the 
withdrawal rights provided by the Italian law, and the possibility of 
extending the protection by using statutory autonomy or shareholders 
agreements. 
As we know, certain organizational and operative decisions of the 
company may sometime require a modification of the bylaws that 
shareholders unanimously approved at the time of the constitution of 
the company.  
While the decisions taken by the board are not able to modify the 
company bylaws, on the contrary shareholders are entitled to amend the 
original rules set forth in the deed of incorporation, provided that such 
modifies are voted by the majority. 
Consequently, the single shareholder opposing to the decision of 
the majority has two options: i) to challenge the decision using his 
power of voice; or ii) to leave the company, in virtue of his right to exit. 
It worth noting that the shareholder meeting expresses its 
decisions through an unilateral and collegial act, to the adoption of 
which all the shareholders can concur. Any deliberation is the result of 
a procedure, whose phases are set by the legislator. 
Therefore, the decision-making procedure is essential. Contrary 
to contracts, where the validity depends on the due expression of the 
will of the parties, otherwise the collegial deliberations depend on the 
majority rule. The deliberations are assumed valid as far as they are 
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taken in compliance with the rules governing its adoption (including all 
the requirements regarding the quorum). 
This because the compliance with the shareholders meeting rules 
is deemed as a sufficient guarantee for the single shareholder. As long 
as such regulations are fulfilled, the shareholder is expected to abide by 
the decisions, regardless of his approval, because his right of voice has 
been safeguarded, even though his will has not prevailed. 
Alongside, should the majority violate the shareholders meeting 
rules, the disagreeing shareholder shall be fully entitled to challenge the 
final decision. 
In consideration of his right of voice, the shareholder (to be 
intended as the minority shareholder holding enough shares in 
accordance with the law) has the power to challenge the deliberation he 
considers damaging of his interests within the proper term, seeking for 
an injunction or a compensation. 
Nevertheless, even if a deliberation is always subject to appeal, 
the positive outcome of the action promoted by the shareholder shall 
depend solely on whether or not the legal requirements are met, as they 
are developed by the doctrine and case law, (at least those regarding the 
voidability of the deliberation). 
Otherwise, should the requirements not be fulfilled, then any 
action brought by the shareholder against the deliberation shall be just 
a pointless disturbance, nonetheless able to be detrimental for the 
interests of the company and the rest of the shareholders. 
Besides the appeal, the shareholder - whether as a single or as a 
holder of a minimum number of shares - has additional remedies to rely 
upon as a reaction in front of an abuse not directly realized by the 
majority, but by the board, which, indeed, represents ultimately the 
majority. 
The shareholder can denounce directly to the tribunal 
irregularities made by the board or by the internal auditors. Whether 
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there are the conditions he can act against the board members or seek 
for redress as long as he has been damaged by intentional or negligent 
acts of the directors. 
Alternatively, the shareholder has the right to exit. Even in this 
case there are two options: the shareholder can assign his share in 
accordance with the rules on transfers or he can exercise the right of 
withdrawal as far as it is provided by the law or the by-laws. 
In order to balance the implementation of the majority rule the 
legal framework has increasingly recognizes the right of the disagreeing 
shareholder to unilaterally untie from the company. In other words, it 
was deemed necessary to protect the shareholder from the consequences 
of the modifications of the by-laws, when he didn’t take part in and he 
considers them as abusive. It is a form of reaction to the wrong 
imposition of the majority, granted by the law as long as certain 
requirements are met, even when there are not violations of procedural 
rules. 
However, also the alternative choice to disinvest causes 
consequences and it is subject to various limits, due to the exigency to 
balance the interests involved, which can be opposite. These might be 
the interest of the majority to approve a certain deliberation, the interest 
of the creditors to the integrity of the company assets, as well as the 
interest of shareholders to protect the company equity. 
As a consequence, the right to withdrawal is deemed as a way to 
prevent possible conflicts between majority and minority, as far as it is 
expressly regulated. This solution is also beneficial, because operated 
before and not after the conflict has emerged, as instead it is the case of 
the appeal. The majority when acts must consider the right of the single 
shareholder to retrieve the value of his investment, by virtue of the 
conditions governing the withdrawal. Specifically, this is certainly not 
comparable to the protection granted by the right to challenge the same 
resolution that authorizes the shareholder to withdraw. 
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The appeal may, in fact, always determine, even where 
unfounded, an action of disturbance against the company, by forcing it 
to defend its position. This outcome might be worsened due to the 
length of the judicial proceeding and the uncertainty of the result of any 
trial 
In view of the above, the right to withdraw has experienced a 
substantial evolution, in respect of its original formulation (back before 
the civil code reform in 2003) as an exceptional faculty to be limited by 
the law, other than favored. 
Until the last reform of the Civil Code, the right of withdrawal 
has been highly regulated as well as specifically limited to few cases, 
in order to globally take in account all the interests (e.g. the strict criteria 
for liquidating the shareholder's share). 
Therefore, the law did not entrust the company statute with the 
faculty to add any other hypothesis of withdrawal, other than those 
expressly included in the Civil Code. 
On the contrary, the reform of the Civil Code shifts the attention 
to such remedy, by modifying the approach. 
Traditionally, the withdrawal from the company was deemed as 
an exceptional mean for protecting the shareholder, to be limited to 
those cases where the shareholder was forced to dissolve the bond with 
the company because of substantial changes affecting the original 
conditions of profitability or increasing the level of risks, as a 
consequence of decision taken by the majority. 
Alongside, a new and different interpretation has emerged and 
then established. The right to withdraw is now perceived as a way for 
the shareholder to easily disinvest. 
In view of the above, the right to withdraw, as currently regulated, 
modifies the bargaining position held by shareholders. Since the 
withdrawal deprives the company of part of its assets, the same 
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company is urged to ponder certain decisions before adopt them, in 
order to prevent the withdrawal.  
The new provisions regarding the right to withdraw have multiple 
functions and are more flexible, especially considering the faculty of 
the company to provide the shareholder with additional exit chances. 
At the same time, as discussed in detail further ahead, the 
withdrawal is clearly favored by the law, which makes more difficult 
for the shareholder to challenge the deliberations before the court. 
Consequently, this hindrance spurs the research for alternative ways of 
protection (for example the idea to grant a pre-shareholders meeting 
interim relief). 
Such seek for alternative protection of the shareholder interests 
appears more relevant in relation with non-listed companies, where the 
shareholders have not the opportunity to transfer the shares as primary 
way to exit the company. It is precisely in this type of company that 
there is the need to make preventive information protections effective, 
as well as the controlling rights of the shareholder, as well as the use of 
statutory autonomy to balance the positions of imbalance between the 
different situations. 
Moreover, the present work aims to analyze in detail the single 
ways how the law protects the minority shareholders within the non-
listed companies limited by shares, with an eye to those situations that 
might be deemed abusive. 
In conclusion, the present thesis intends to address, under a 
systematic evaluation, the rules governing how the shareholder can 
express, in good faith, his dissent. It analyzes in details the issues related 
to the enforcement of the majority rule and its limits, even in 
consideration of the risks regarding possible abuses, which can frustrate 
the aims pursued by the law. 
The first chapter focuses on how the shareholders meeting takes 
its deliberations, with a special attention to the procedure, which acts as 
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a guarantee in order to secure that the will of the shareholders is 
properly formed, being the decision of the majority prevailing over the 
position of the minority, in accordance to the relevant rules. 
However, whether the rules governing the decision making 
process are violated, the law vests the shareholders with the right to 
appeal. The second chapter gives a detailed overview of this matter, 
describing the requirements and limitations the action of the 
shareholder is subject to. Then the review follows the remedies 
provided by the law, such as the complaint (to the court or the board of 
statutory auditors), the action for liability or for damages against the 
directors. 
The third chapter is about the withdrawal considered as special 
remedy the law offers to the shareholder in order to manifest 
disagreement with respect to certain occurrences, which are deemed so 
significant to need a protection, irrespectively of the recurring of a 
misbehavior by the majority. 
The fourth chapter analyzes the protections that the shareholder 
can enjoy thanks to the choice of statutory autonomy to derogate from 
the law, through the widening of the individual rights of the 
shareholeders, the provision of election procedures for the 
administrative and control bodies plus favorable and the recognition of 
further special rights. 
